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Introduction
How do logisticians support the battles of the future? Do the techniques and procedures of today have to be fundamentally altered? Why?
It is generally accepted that we are in a period of profound change for the U.S.
military. The former Vice Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Admiral Bill Owens consistently used, if in fact did not invent, the term Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA)
and championed the case that this was such a period in history. The degree of this transformation is uncertain and there is wide disagreement whether the change will be either evolutionary and incremental or truly revolutionary and radical. The fact that the technology of the world, and information technology in particular, is advancing at a profound rate, virtually assures some measure of change for the military as well. The
Chairman of the JCS issued Joint Vision 2010 in order to shape and focus the near future and the document acknowledges the emerging importance of information superiority.1
The Army, through Force XXI initiatives and Army Vision 20102 , has articulated a similar picture of leveraging technology to gain information dominance and superiority to the same ends. In fact, the Army is already extending the institutional long range without an RMA within logistics, a revolution in military logistics (RML), the forces as a whole will be incapable of gaining full benefit from an RMA. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff puts it bluntly, "Without an RML there will be no RMA or AAN.'3 Furthermore, cost reductions within the logistics system provide the funds for future combat systems.
The Army Chief of Staff commissioned an AAN project with guidance to focus and shape the final products is clear-narrow the gap between heavy and light forces, improve mobility, enhance firepower, and, finally, revolutionize logistical concepts. 4 The cost burden of the present logistic support tail must be significantly lowered. New technologies must provide agility, support force projection, reduce excess demand and waste. The support forces must be tailorable to requirements. Only with profound, indeed revolutionary, changes can we lessen the logistics burden and fund the cost of the modernization of the force. Clearly, the Army is viewing the potential resource savings of a leaner and improved logistical support structure as the billpayer for future systems modernization. Without advances in logistics, an RMA for U.S. forces, and the Army in particular, is not possible. 
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Why is the decision and commitment to RMA in logistics critical today? Why is the close of the 1990s an important decision point? Simply;
As we move beyond 2010, most of the major weapon systems supporting Force XXI will be approaching the end of their life cycle. The Army will be faced with the decision to either continue investing in incremental improvements in existing platforms which could extend their usefulness to about 2025, or taking the required steps required to replace these aging weapon systems with totally new systems designed to take advantage of the technological advances which have occurred over the years.6
The Army recognizes that the Force XXI effort is not the RMA, but a potentially important but incremental step along the way. Force XXI was initially envisioned to be a force rapidly tailorable, rapidly expandable, and strategically deployable. It supports the new military strategy to fight opposing forces that lack the sophistication and technology advantages of the United States within the two medium regional conflict (MRC) construct. A key goal was to make these forces lighter without sacrificing lethality and
survivability. Yet, it is extraordinarily difficult to radically change the nature of warfighting while retaining existing equipment 7 . A tank, still the Ml series through the early 21 st century, will still weigh in excess of 70 tons with additional informational technology appliqu6 applied. It is certainly no more mobile and is still restricted in movement by weight limits of the bridges in possible areas of hostility. The organization of the Force XXI divisions remain similar to those of today. This is hardly suprising since the major existing systems presently in the force will still be in place (important exceptions are the Commanche helicopter and perhaps the Crusader Howitzer-providing full production funds are available). Commitment to new technology can also make the existing (and expensive) technology obsolete and commits the U.S. to a high-tech force which, as low-tech enemy, may achieve a successful asymmetric response. 8 Force XXI becomes an interim step to a true RMA.
Again, the national military strategy and the mission of the Army have profoundly changed. We can no longer focus and design our structure to fight the great European land conflict. That war was won and the present, though perhaps tenuous, national strategy of having the capability to fight two MRCs (and included as an assumption is the ability to support a variety of requirements across the broad spectrum of conflict) has superseded the old. There is little doubt that force structure will not be permitted to expand to reflect this broadening of missions. To the contrary, the trend continues to be in the opposite direction, with great pressure to continue reductions of active duty personnel. With that decision made by our superiors, we are and must be an Army of quality, not one of quantity.
Whether this strategy survives is not as important to the logisticians as the fundamental fact that, whatever the number of MRCs or lesser contingencies anticipated, we are a expected to perform successfully as a force projection force coming primarily from the continental United States. Clearly, there are different considerations for major weapon and support systems designed for the previous permanent pre-positioned presence forward in the potential battle area as opposed to those of rapid projection into any geographical area.
Technology is changing at an exponential rate. The Force XXI systems may not be the world's leading warfighting systems if we do not improve them over time. Technology growth will require organization changes in both the assets and business practices used. This march of technology will result in the need for spending more time and money to keep ourselves and products current. procedures cannot be applied backward to the existing C-5 fleet and still maintain desired readiness levels. Likewise, unless the probability of hit and kill per round from a given weapon system markedly improves, logisticians still need to provide the warfighter with essentially the same number of rounds as today to assure the required kill rate. An improved probability of kill rising from 77 to 80% has only a marginal effect on the support structure which measures resupply in truckloads. To achieve that degree of change, would likely require a new system deployed to the force designed from the outset to meet the higher levels of effectiveness. If the way the land force maneuvers, moves, and fights changes because of profound improvements in the capabilities of their platforms, the logistical tail can and must be changed as well. A logistician that can't keep up or see the friendly forces, can't adequately support. If the combat platforms dramatically increase in speed and maneuver, support vehicles must have a commensurate improvement. Accepting that the Joint Vision of 2010 is largely met, the battlefield of the past has been largely replaced by a non linear battlespace defined by depth, breath, and height.12 U.S. forces, through information and technological innovations, will have achieved dominant maneuver, increased ability for precision engagement, more control of the battlespace through full dimensional protection, and some measure of focused logistics. The Army vision further refines the ground war patterns with improvements in our ability to project the force (clearly improved with increased numbers of C-i 7s and the commissioning of the large medium speed roll on-roll off ships), decisive operations and shaping of the battlespace, protection of the force to assure increased freedom of maneuver, and finally, sustainment of the force. Nonetheless, these enablers are largely attached to the materiel of the existing Army. The bulk of the change and improvements must come from technology enhancements attached to systems already within the force.
These are evolutionary life cycle improvements rather than the revolutionary change to warfare that accompanies a new system such as experienced when the first attack helicopters were introduced. It is through these appliquds on end items and the linking and access to information never readily available before that changes the fight. As an example, the engaged forces will have real time access to national reconnaissance assets with imagery available to lower and multiple levels of command.
What has happened to logistics with this near future force? Logisticians of 2010 will also be operating in a different environment. The vision documents perceive "the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics 8 packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations."'1 3 Yet, technological improvements are the key to achieving logistical improvements in this timeframe since the force will still be utilizing primarily the existing support systems of today (wheeled trucks, palletized loading system, rotary and fixed wing aircraft) on the battlefield. Clearly, the reduction of in place stocks, the iron mountains of the past, will make the logistical tail of the fighting force smaller and more agile and at the same time. Logistics are more predictive, responsive, and visible to the operators and those supported. Large brute force push packages have been largely supplanted by smaller, rapidly moving pull packages. The past practice of physically stockpiling thirty days or more of supplies in theater for everything the warfighter believed needed are gone. Through such brute force logistics, essentially unchanged since World War II, support was assured and success largely guaranteed. However, the costs of such stocks are prohibitive and the sheer size of these base stocks do not support a power projection force capable of rapid movement and engagement of the new strategy. On ground stockpiles of critical items are measured in two, three, or five days of supply. The goal, in broad terms, is affordable and responsive support that is modular and tailorable to meet mission requirements.
The 2010 logisticians should enjoy a mature capability of total asset visibility (TAV) for materiel and a similar picture for personnel. Through the interconnection of new and legacy information and management systems, a worldwide asset picture is available. However, some of those same legacy systems will inevitably inhibit real time complete access and operation. The Global Combat Support System (GCSS), the Although not consolidated, there will be increased cooperation between the logistical components of the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and private industry. Common application of electronic management and information systems will create linkages from factory to foxhole, with the civil sector assuming more responsibility for warehousing, maintenance and materiel management1 5 at one end of the pipeline and LOGCAP at the other. The Army will still have both TO&E and TDA units within the logistics structure although they will be composed of smaller modular units that, at the appropriate level, are capable of task organization.
Finally, it should be recognized that there are at least two tiers of forces within the Army. Clearly, the Service cannot equip the full force with the digital technology presently being evaluated by the experimental force (EXFOR), of the 4th Infantry Division. A corps, perhaps two at the maximum, will be equipped with the necessary appliqu6s and provided the additional resources, such as improved communications, to meet the desired capabilities of Force XXI and the Army Vision 2010. Likely, logisticians will be expected to support two tiers of active combat forces and additional tiers in the reserve structure.
In summary, logistics has been changed. Instead of forward deployed resources, the bulk of stocks are CONUS based. The focus is no longer the NATO European environment but one of rapid response to a variety of locations and multiple missions.
Massive in place stockpiles are largely supplanted by a responsive, high velocity transportation system. Asset visibility has been markedly improved. It also means that the logistical support will have many of the characteristics of the battle forces. Just as the combat forces mass only when required, the logistical elements will do likewise and form support locations only as required and quickly diffuse when the immediate support mission is accomplished. The joint task force J-3 and J-4
will have to work current operations in close coordination and harmonization.
Logisticians within the battlespace will have to become experts of maneuver. The movements and massing/demassing of the combat and logistical forces carefully synchronized to assure success.
Within the battlespace, the logistician's main protection is the same battlefield awareness enjoyed by his combat compatriot. The combat team leaders and their supporting logisticians must see and work with a common battlefield picture, common planning tools, and common predictive models. Secondly, the mobility of the vehicles supporting the battle force must be equal in range and speed. The envisioned battlespace is not linear and the logisticians must quickly maneuver to meet the combat forces in a temporary relatively safe space, which are not homogeneously scattered around the area of operation.
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Fixed and slow-moving targets will fare poorly on tomorrow's battlefield. Any object with a fixed latitude and longitude can be targeted (with low-cost, highly accurate aiming systems) and struck. These weapons will use a combination of improved gyroscopes and accelerometers, navigational devices, global position system (GPS) satellites, and local positioning signals from pre-positioned emitters.
Additionally, speed provides protection in itself and offsets the lack of other forms of protection, by limiting exposure in dangerous areas. To provide the logistic vehicles with heavy protection approximating the fighting force would necessarily limit their load capacity. Every pound of armor is one less pound of support materiel. This tradeoff again is not unlike the support arms of the sister Services who do not heavily armor tankers (both air and sea) or supply ships. The support ships (or aircraft) rapidly move in and then move out, their speed and short length of exposure being their primary protection.
To support the battle, logisticians will focus the nation's resources. Outside the immediate battle area, logisticians may operate mobile bases that provide more extensive support. This could include pre-positioned afloat intermediate support bases; ships designed for a support function and is a logical extension of the present Marine Corps concept of ship based logistics. Combat forces could move to these safe areas (their location dependent upon obtaining this security) and obtain fabrication from raw materials and "creature comfort" supply and services. Combat systems would have major battle damage repaired and components with a predicted failure, replaced. The battlespace logisticians reach back to these bases for their resupply.
"Procurement agility" is a strategic issue 23 and national resources, because there is total visibility of assets and capability, can be leveraged to support the battle directly. 16 Requirements may be placed directly on the industrial base with a "just in time" delivery directly to the battlespace. Today, Class VIII medical materiel requirements are sent directly from the commercial supplier to the user, proving that this is possible. A cultural shift from unit ownership of resources will need to be replaced with a discipline of unit management responsibility but national ownership and use. Although located in a specific location, they are part of the national "virtual warehouse" under consolidated materiel management. Thus, an item in a unit stockage, such as an ASL or basic load (or their AAN equivalent), with an integrated distribution system (a mature Velocity Management), is be available for a contingency across the world if not specifically authorized retention due to an authorized higher priority.
Who controls logistic support and these priorities of materiel to the warfighter? The next reasonable consolidation of functions to support the AAN is the establishment of a national level logistics provider. As in the Division XXI design where support was removed from the maneuver brigades and consolidated in the DISCOM, the same general logic applies at the higher echelons. As envisioned by the Logistics Integration Agency;
The Army National Provider contains the national level capability to manage, resource, and control the materiel management, maintenance, procurement, distribution, and deployment functions for the Army or other joint and combined customers. The Army National Provider brings the full power of the National Logistics Base (DoD Civilian resources as well as our U.S. Industrial Base), to satisfy the logistics needs of the supported CINC over a seamless pipeline of support that extends directly to the warfighting element.
The National Provider is responsible to fill the common pipeline to the warfighting CINCs and owns all resources above that which is traditionally accepted as direct support. It fundamentally changes the concept of ownership of stocks, whatever the class. A unit may maintain a stock and store it, but it remains under the ownership of the National Provider who may direct usage elsewhere. Less we think this is too revolutionary, remember that overseas Army class V stocks are treated in this way with only a fraction of the in theater stocks actually "owned" by that geographical CINC. The remainder may be swung to whomever the national priorities dictate. Likewise, propositioned afloat resources may be directed wherever needed.
The National Provider would also control DOD industrial operations and maintain the contractual relationships with the civilian industrial base. Again, comparison with TRANSCOM cannot be avoided. CINCTRANS is the single DOD point of focus to contract and leverage civilian transportation resources to support the requirements of plans and ongoing operations. TRANSCOM performs the transportation feasibility analysis and determines it national transportation resources can adequately support strategic operation plans. Likewise, the National Logistics Provider, or CINCLOG, would do the same. There would be a single command to define the requirements, contract with the industrial base, keep warm key operations, maintain key stocks, and ensure a seamless plug in to the battle area of operations logisticians. This command would determine the logistical feasibility of warfighting CINCs plans. There would be one voice for strategic and operational logistic support. 19 Because of the existing responsibilities already incumbent on the Army to support other forces and establish the common lines of communication, maintains the LOGCAP contract, and control most wholesale class V, it is a logical candidate to serve as the National Provider. Just as the commander of the Air Force Air Mobility Command is dual hatted as CINCTRANS, the commander of the Army Materiel Command could also serve concurrently as CINCLOG.
Pitfalls and Conclusions
The envisioned logistical organization for the forces of Army After Next clearly brings with it an additional set of risks which must be carefully considered. First, it is unlikely that the Army will have the resources to fully modernize the entire force. There will be, inevitably, tiered forces. Some, perhaps only the "tip of the spear" will be a fully modernized battle force. The remainder of the Army will remain more conventional and probably similar to the forces of today. The logistical structure in place must accommodate multi-tiered forces.
Secondly, the logisticians within the battlespace must have mobility, or at the very least speed, comparable to the force being supported. The non linear nature of the battle and the fact that the logisticians are maneuvering constantly to support the battle swarms require this capability.
Finally, without a CINCLOG, it is unclear how the resources of the nation could be effectively focused to provide the necessary support in light of the inevitable reductions of stocks available to DOD. The "iron mountains" are out and their 20 replacement, the "virtual mountains" located throughout the world must be managed and allocated according to national priorities.
These are fundamental cultural changes in the way logisticians support and how the warfighters measure it. It trades proven, but now excessively expensive ways of doing the support business, for major technological innovation. It requires unparalleled trust, coordination, and synchronization between the G/J-3s and G/J-4s of the future. It is indeed a revolution in logistical affairs, which if successful, will provide the funds through substantial savings in stocks, to modernize the force. The choice for the Army is actually quite simple. Stay with the existing logistical organization, structure, and functions and have, at best, an evolutionary change in force capability. Or, take the visionary approach, leverage the information age and other technologies, and revolutionize logistics. 
